Arthur Kroeger's (2009) Retiring the Crow Rate: A Narrative of Political Management focuses on the 1980-83 period leading up to the Western Grain Transportation Act which repealed the statutory Crow Rate. The book is a valuable case study of managing an important policy file through the obstacles of the Canadian political system and amongst the rapids of opposing policy constituents. This insider assessment of the machinations of Ottawa intrigue and regional politics demonstrates — with wit and wisdom — the tenuousness of victory and the ever present dangers of defeat inherent when challenging entrenched institutions and managing radical policy change. The objective of this paper is to highlight the features of the narrative which are archetypical for effective public policy management of complex issues.

Introduction

For anyone not involved in transportation policy prior to about 1990 the ‘Crow Rate’ issue would seem to be ancient history of little relevance today. Not so. This paper argues that the Crow Rate reform process is a highly informative case study in the complexities of successful public policy management. Most of this paper involves a careful reading and analysis of the contents of Kroeger’s book along with reference to secondary literature to elaborate specific points.

Background

The ‘Crow Rate’ was the statutory rate for railway movement of grain from country elevator to ports established in 1897. Its intent was to finance the construction of a railway by Canadian Pacific (CPR) to southern British Columbia with the assistance of federal subsidies.

The Crow Rate was a small part of the political price extracted by the federal government from CPR to ensure broad political support for a subsidy to be paid to the railway and avoid the appearance of government over-generosity. The Crow Rate came to be embedded in the Western Canadian psyche as their regional benefit from Confederation – on par with the construction of the CPR (ensuring British Columbia’s entrance) and the National Policy of high tariffs to protect nascent manufacturing (benefiting Ontario and Quebec).¹

Historians have linked Confederation, land settlement, the trans­continental railway and tariffs as part of Prime Minister Macdonald’s National Policy of the 1870-90s which has been termed ‘defensive expansionism’ in reaction to the threat of territorial expansion under the American policy of ‘manifest destiny’ (Eden and Molot 1993).²

Methodology

This paper is an exercise in hermeneutics – i.e., the close reading and critical interpretation of a written text. The interpretation is that of the present author and is subject to the criticism that the author is projecting unwarranted judgment into the reading of the text. However, I feel there is ample evidence to support these judgments.

Kroeger’s first degree was in English and, as a senior public servant, he was a careful and precise writer, who valued the classical arts of discourse: grammar, logic and rhetoric.

¹  Earl (1996) persuasively argues that this myth was a construct of the 1920s resumption of the Crow Rate following its suspension during WW1. Berry et al. (1983) and Earl (2011) provide useful further history of the Crow Rate.

²  Macdonald was responding to similar policies pursued by various American administrations (e.g., Adams/Jackson/Monroe/Polk).